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Introduction
Wynne Godley,our Levy Institute colleague,has warned since 1999 that the falling personal saving
and rising borrowing trends that had powered the U.S. economic expansion were not sustainable.
He also warned that when these trends were reversed, as has happened in other countries, the
expansion would come to a halt unless there were major changes in fiscal policy.
Not long ago, official circles insisted that monetary policy was the most effective tool, and
that fiscal deficits were not only unnecessary but also harmful (Economic Report of the President
2000, pp. 31–34; Greenspan 2000). Some economists, notably Edmund Phelps of Columbia
University, went so far as to suggest that the economic expansion was not caused by rising
demand, but rather because growth had become “structural”(Phelps 2000).
Yet fiscal policy has made a swift and major comeback, not simply as tax cuts and military
expenditures, but also as huge budget deficits. Three years ago, at the beginning of 2001, there
was a government surplus of $113 billion.
1 One year later this had become a deficit of $292 billion.
According to the latest available figures, by the third quarter of 2003 the deficit had grown to
$604 billion. The historical events that gave rise to this change in practice are well known. But
they may also signal a growing recognition of the limited effect of monetary policy. Many col-
leagues at The Levy Economics Institute have long argued that government deficits, albeit of a
different composition, would be necessary to sustain economic growth when private sector bor-
rowing reached its limits (Godley 1999; Papadimitriou and Wray 2001; Godley and Izurieta
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to Professor Papadimitriou at 845-758-7700.2001). At the same time, we have emphasized the limits of this
recourse, for deficits are always linked to debts. This is the
theme we explore in this Strategic Analysis.
As we expected, real GDP growth responded dramatically
to the rise in government deficits: in 2001, growth stood at 0.5
percent; in 2002, it was 2.2 percent; and by the fourth quarter
of 2003, it was 4.1 percent, having previously reached a peak
of 8.2 percent in the third quarter of 2003. In this process,
profits and productivity have soared.
Until very recently, however, employment and wage
incomes have lagged far behind. Job growth was weak through-
out 2003, despite high rates of output growth. Official statistics
based on payroll surveys indicate that 1.89 million jobs have
been lost since President Bush took office three years ago. Those
statistics also show that only 8,000 jobs were created in
December 2003,97,000 in January 2004,and 46,000 in February
2004. Official views have acknowledged this discrepancy
between output growth and employment growth, which they
have attributed to an extraordinary surge in productivity. The
rate of growth of real GDP per employee stood at 7.7 percent
in the third quarter of 2003. While this rate of growth was
high, such quarterly productivity growth rates are by no means
unusual, and are typically followed by sharply lower ones (see
Figure 7). Indeed, by the fourth quarter of 2003, productivity
growth had fallen to 1.9 percent. What is relevant to employ-
ment prospects is the average rate of growth over longer peri-
ods, which we analyze in the next section.
In any case, the latest figures appear to tell a dramatically
different story: according to the payroll survey, nonfarm jobs
grew by 308,000 in March. This recovery of employment is in
line with our analysis of the effects of the greatly expanded
budget deficits, which we discuss below. But it is important to
place this in context. Some 134,000 new jobs must be created
every month just to absorb the growth in the workforce.
2
From this point of view, total job creation from December
2003 to March 2004 was still 77,000 short of the number needed
just to absorb new entrants.
Moreover, there is continuing dispute over the actual
numbers of jobs created, because the two different methods
employed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
3 give differ-
ent results. The payroll survey indicates that jobs rose from
46,000 in February to 308,000 in March. At the same time, the
household survey indicates a virtually constant level of job
creation, 146,471 in February and 146,650 in March. Nor have
employment measures and unemployment rates moved
together. For instance, the March surge in payroll job estimates
has actually been accompanied by a slight rise in the unem-
ployment rate, from 5.6 percent in February to 5.7 percent.
Despite the murkiness of the job picture,it is widely agreed
that new jobs increasingly encompass low-quality, low-wage
employment. According to the lead author of a recent study
on employment measures, at “no other point in the nation’s
last five recovery periods have so many people been employed
as independent contractors, as temporarily self-employed, or
paid under the table” (Andrew M. Sum, as cited in Uchitelle
2004, p. 2). Furthermore, as shown by the “Employment
Situation” report recently released by the BLS, more than 4.9
million persons currently want jobs, in addition to the 8.3 mil-
lion unemployed (BLS 2004). The weakness in the labor market
also shows up in the virtual stagnation of hourly earnings,
which have recently grown “at the slowest pace ever recorded”
(Goldman Sachs 2003,p.2).Real hourly earnings,i.e.,the dollar
amount of earnings adjusted for the cost of living, have actually
begun to fall (BLS 2004). Similarly, total employee compensa-
tion has also begun to fall,in both dollar and inflation-adjusted
terms. Thus, while the present recovery has been very good for
profits, it has yet to have a positive impact on employment
and wages.
In any case, the administration and Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan remain optimistic about growth
and employment over the near term, and do not seem alarmed
by the sharp rise in government and current account deficits
over this same time horizon. Over the longer run, however,
even they express concerns about a series of potential prob-
lems. These include an inevitable rise in the real federal funds
rate to a “more neutral level,”a growing pressure to bring fiscal
budgets back into line by cutting government spending or by
raising taxes, and a growing pressure to curtail the current
account deficit. Others, such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), are openly pessimistic, and have recently warned
that the large current account and government budget deficits
may drive up both global and U.S. interest rates, crowd out
private investment, and erode productivity growth (see discus-
sion below). The markets are already signaling this concern:
one day after the March job growth surge, the yield on the
Treasury’s 10-year note jumped from 3.88 percent to 4.15 per-
cent. This was the largest one-day run-up since March 1996
(Fuerbringer 2004).
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Our focus in this and previous Strategic Analyses has
been on the medium term. In previous policy reports, we sug-
gested that because the private sector was moving toward
financial balance, it would take large fiscal deficits to provide
the fuel needed to jump-start and maintain economic growth.
But we warned that leaving matters alone would lead to large
fiscal deficits paired with equally large current account
deficits. In October 2002 we considered a depreciation of the
currency to be an essential element of the overall policy pre-
scription, and traced out the impact of a 25-percent decline in
the broad index of the dollar. In our subsequent report of
October 2003, we noted that the exchange rate had already
depreciated by 6 percent.
Large budget deficits have come to pass, as have concomi-
tant increases in the current account deficit. At the same time,
the currency has continued to depreciate. Its broad index has
declined a further 2.7 percent since our previous Strategic
Analysis, and in the words of the European Central Bank pres-
ident Jean-Claude Trichet, its decline against the euro has been
“brutal.”
In the next section we examine the current state of the
economy in some detail. Then, in the final section, we assess
the implications of recent economic events for the future path
of the economy. We find that while present monetary and fis-
cal policy stances are likely to lead to robust growth and
improved employment, this would come only at the expense
of high government deficits, record foreign deficits, and rising
ratios of government and foreign debt relative to GDP. Even
under the best of circumstances, with constant interest rates,
this scenario is unsustainable. It would be even more so if
interest rates rose, as projected by the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) and now anticipated by many observers. We
therefore consider two alternative strategies for halving the
government deficit in five years: curtailing government spend-
ing, which is the path favored by the present administration;
and rolling back recent tax cuts. Our model shows that the lat-
ter yields substantially higher growth and substantially lower
unemployment.
The Current State of the Economy
The return of large and growing fiscal deficits is the first strik-
ing element of recent times. As a matter of accounting, the
“internal” financial balances (receipts minus nonfinancial
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Figure 2  Growth in Real GDP 
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expenditures) of the private sector plus the government sector
must equal the “external” financial balance—that is, the cur-
rent account balance. The private sector encompasses house-
holds and businesses; just a few years ago, it was running large
deficits, but as we have been projecting in previous reports
(Papadimitriou et al. 2002; Shaikh et al. 2003), it has been rap-
idly reversing itself. At present the overall balance has even
moved to a small surplus, because the financial surplus of the
business sector has more than offset the deficit of the house-
hold sector. Consequently, the current account deficit now
mirrors the government deficit. Nearly twin deficits are back,
as Figure 1 displays. In Figures 1 through 9, the shaded area
represents the time in office of the current administration.
As the unprecedented private sector deficits have receded,
their place has been taken by large and growing budget
deficits. These have succeeded in pulling the economy out of
the 2001 downturn and sustaining current growth. As shown
in Figure 2, the growth rate of the economy has risen rapidly
in response to the burgeoning fiscal deficits. With this higher
growth has come greatly enhanced profitability, for not only
do deficits increase personal-sector disposable income (since
the income created by the government exceeds taxes collected
whenever there is a deficit), but they directly add to corporate
profits (Papadimitriou and Wray 1998).
Figure 3 depicts total real corporate profits,
4 which in a
short space of time have already surpassed the peak they had
previously achieved at the height of the stock market bubble.
Alternatively, Figure 4 shows that the share of profits in total
GDP behaved in a similar manner, although it is still just short
of its previous peak.
Similar benefits have not yet been conferred on labor.
Figure 5 displays total nonfarm employment, which began to
fall in 2001 and has only just begun to rebound. As we noted
earlier, official statistics based on payroll surveys indicate that
even the most recent surge in job growth has not managed to
erase the job deficits of the past three months. Figure 6 depicts
the civilian unemployment rate and the labor-force participa-
tion rate.We observe that the unemployment rate rose sharply
beginning in the first quarter of 2001, peaked in the third
quarter of 2003, and declined slightly in the last quarter. The
most recent monthly surge in job growth, which is not dis-
played on this quarterly chart, has nonetheless been attended
by a small rise in the unemployment rate.
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On the surface, one would expect the unemployment rate
to fall when job growth was positive. This is not necessarily the
case, however, because population growth and immigration
tend to swell the pool of those looking for work each month.In
addition, previously employed people move in and out of the
pool of job seekers. When times are bad, people who become
discouraged and give up looking for work are not counted as
being unemployed. This reduces the apparent pool of those
seeking work. Conversely, when the economic climate seems to
be improving, as it was in March, people move back into this
same pool.This process is reflected in the labor-force participa-
tion rate, which measures the sum of those who have jobs (the
officially employed) and those who are counted as looking for
work (the officially unemployed), in relation to the civilian
noninstitutional population. Figure 6 shows that this quarterly
figure has dropped consistently since the first quarter of 2001.
The weakness in the labor market is widely attributed to a
“stunning” growth in productivity (Greenspan 2004b). Figure
7 depicts the annualized growth rate of quarterly real GDP per
employee,
5 from 1960 through 2003 (such quarterly data will
not embody new monthly results until three months are in
hand). We observe that recent productivity growth (in the
shaded area) has indeed been very high, soaring to 7.7 percent
in the third quarter of 2003, and falling thereafter to a mere
1.9 percent. Such fluctuations are by no means unusual in his-
torical perspective, since similar volatility has been recorded 
at various points in the 1960s and 1970s. For this reason we

















1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004






































Figure 6  Quarterly Unemployment and Labor Force  
Participation Rates
Source: BLS (last observation 2004:1)
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continue to expect productivity growth to remain moderate in
the near future. Hence, if output growth persists, employment
and total wage income should improve markedly. This is more
or less the consensus view (Bernanke 2004; Goldman Sachs
2003; Greenspan 2004b). Indeed, the current average rate of
growth of productivity is not substantially different from the
historical average of about 1.6 percent,
6 which in turn defines
the medium-term growth rate needed just to maintain the
present level of unemployment. Because the pool of available
labor also rises continually, growth rates higher than 1.6 per-
cent would evidently be required to maintain the rate of
unemployment, and still higher ones to bring it down.
To summarize, large fiscal deficits have pumped up growth
and profits but have left employment and wage income mori-
bund. Because the private (household and business) sector has
moved into a small financial surplus, the large government
deficits mirror the large current account deficits. And these in
turn imply rising government and foreign debts,respectively.
What are the implications of this state of affairs? Official
views seem optimistic about the near-term prospects for
growth and employment, and are not overly concerned about
the near-term consequences of the sharp rise in government
and current account deficits.
According to Federal Reserve Board member Ben S.
Bernanke, “2003 seems to have marked the turning point for
the U.S. economy, and we have reason to be optimistic that
2004 will see even more growth and continued progress in
reducing unemployment.
“The Federal Reserve enters 2004 with monetary policy
that is unusually accommodative in historical terms, relative to
the stage of the business cycle. That accommodation is justi-
fied, I believe, by the current very low level of inflation, and by
the productivity gains and the weakness in the labor market,
both of which suggest that inflation is likely to remain sub-
dued”(Bernanke 2004, p. 7).
Alan Greenspan is similarly optimistic:“Overall, the econ-
omy has made impressive gains in output and real incomes . . .
[even though] progress in creating jobs has been limited....
Looking forward, the prospects are good for sustained expan-
sion of the U.S. economy. . . . In all likelihood, employment
will begin to grow more quickly before long as output contin-
ues to expand . . . [and] the currency depreciation we have
experienced of late should eventually help to contain our cur-
rent account deficit”(Greenspan 2004b, pp. 1, 3, 4).
These same spokesmen are notably more cautious on
long-run prospects, expressing concerns about the conse-
quences of an inevitable rise in the real federal funds rate, and
about the adjustments that might have to be made to contain
excessively high government and current account deficits
(Greenspan 2004b). Others move beyond mere worry to out-
right pessimism. For instance, the IMF warned recently that
the current deficit-driven “economic recovery may come at the
eventual cost of upward pressure on interest rates, a crowding
out of private investment, and an erosion of longer-term pro-
ductivity growth”(Mühleisen and Towe 2004, p. 5).
7
Our concerns are somewhat different. Having argued for
some time that consumer spending cannot keep its pace, we
are gratified to find that this view has become virtually unani-
mous (Krugman 2003; Bies 2004). For a long time now,
sharply falling interest rates have enabled households to bor-
row heavily without incurring an explosive growth in their
debt service burdens. Figure 8 profiles the household debt
service (principal and interest payment) burden based on the
Federal Reserve’s latest revisions. At the end of the third quar-
ter of 2003, the debt service payments accounted for 13.1 per-
cent of disposable income, which is very close to the record
high of 13.3 percent in 2001, and considerably higher than the
mid-1993 level of almost 11 percent.
The Federal Reserve also provides a broader measure (the
financial obligations ratio) that includes lease payments for
automobiles, rent, homeowner’s insurance payments, and
property taxes in the overall debt service burden. This ratio
peaked at an all-time high of 18.73 percent of disposable
income in the last quarter of 2002, and still remained above
18.3 percent in the third quarter of 2003. These levels are sig-
nificantly higher than the 16.25 percent ratio reached a decade
earlier. Interest rates are still near all-time lows, while debt and
debt service burdens are near all-time highs.
The increasing household debt burden has given rise to
an unprecedented record of consumer bankruptcies, as shown
in Figure 9. These translate into 1.66 million bankruptcy fil-
ings for the year ending September 30, 2003—an increase of
7.4 percent from the previous year as reported by the federal
judiciary (Kanell 2004). With interest rates having bottomed
out, further increases in debt burdens could sharply increase
debt service burdens and accelerate bankruptcies. We believe
that this represents a significant danger. The official view
seems to miss this point when it argues that “the householdThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
sector seems to be in good shape, and much of the apparent
increase in the household sector’s debt ratios over the past
decade reflects factors that do not suggest increasing house-
hold financial stress”(Greenspan 2004a, p. 5).
Financial and business constituencies have focused
instead on the possibility that large government deficits might
renew inflationary pressures and lead to rising interest rates.
While we remain vigilant about the prospect of inflation, we
are more concerned about a possible drop in demand for U.S.
assets by foreign creditors such as China and Japan. In this
respect, we agree with Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan
and others who also express similar concerns.
In any case, our focus is on a different set of questions.
What is the likely growth path induced by anticipated levels of
government deficits, and what implications does this have for
current account deficits and for foreign debt? Will growth fade if
government deficits are reduced once the election cycle is over?
What will this do to employment growth, given that productiv-
ity growth seems to have settled at a much higher level than in
the past? Will the current account deficit also be reduced, or will
the private sector deficit reappear, leaving the current account
deficit intractably large? We turn to these issues next.
Postelection Scenarios
In our Strategic Analysis of October 2003, we contrasted the
CBO’s budget projections with what we considered to be “a
more realistic path” for the general government balance.
Subsequent events have broadly confirmed our projections.
In examining the likely outcomes of our projected budget
paths, we incorporated the CBO’s own assumption that house-
holds would use some portion of their tax cuts to reduce their
debt. But it appears that rising equity markets and the prospect
of an increase in disposable income arising from planned tax
cuts overcame any concerns households might have had about
their high debt levels. Thus households continued to increase
their expenditure—mainly on durables and housing—without
significantly reducing their rate of borrowing. For this reason,
economic growth was somewhat higher than our previous
projections. So, too, have been the levels of personal sector
debt relative to private income.
In what follows, we examine the medium-term conse-
quences of three alternative policy scenarios. The first of these,
which we call the “baseline” scenario, examines the likely 
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economic outcomes of present fiscal and monetary policy.
Unsustainably high budget deficits and record current account
deficits are characteristic of this path. Therefore, the next two
scenarios contrast two alternative methods of halving budget
deficits over the next five years: reducing government expendi-
tures (Scenario 1) versus rolling back tax cuts (Scenario 2). As
we shall see, the output and employment paths are strikingly
different in these two scenarios.
Since the focus of our analysis is on alternative fiscal poli-
cies, we keep interest rates constant in all simulations.
8 We also
assume that the private sector will keep borrowing, albeit at a
slower pace than in the past, so that the private sector balance
tends to stabilize. On other fronts, we retain the assumptions of
our previous Strategic Analysis: world growth at 3.7 percent in
2004, and 3.35 percent thereafter; world inflation around 2 per-
cent throughout the simulation period; and the exchange rate
falling at an annual rate of 3 percent in 2004, but stabilizing
thereafter. Following recent predictions (The Economist 2004),
we assume domestic inflation to be 1.5 percent throughout.
The Baseline Policy Scenario: 
Extending Present Policy 
Our baseline scenario essentially projects the consequences of
present economic policy. As detailed in our previous report,
we utilize the CBO’s projections of government spending. We
also assume that present tax cuts will be extended and recent
budget proposals enacted. Coupled with the assumed con-
stancy of interest rates, this set of assumptions gives us a direct
extension of present policy. It should be noted that we display
our simulation results only until 2008, and they are always
presented as annual values, not quarterly ones.
The two baseline figures (10 and 11) tell the main story.
The assumed deceleration in private borrowing would bring
the private sector into balance. But it would also reduce the
growth of demand coming from the private sector. This
decline would, however, be more than offset by rising govern-
ment deficits and by sustained export growth due to the
depreciation of the dollar. The government deficit would
worsen from its annual level of 5.2 percent of GDP in 2003 to
5.8 percent in 2004, and stabilize thereafter. The current
account deficit would also deteriorate before it stabilized at a
record 5.8 percent of GDP. The stabilization would occur
because accelerated export growth would be counterbalanced























































8The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
by accelerated import growth, owing to the fact that the
United States would be growing faster than its trading part-
ners. Real GDP growth would jump from 3.1 percent in 2003
to 4.1 percent in 2004, and would stay between 4.1 percent
and 4.4 percent thereafter. On the assumption that productiv-
ity growth would return to its average post–World War II
level, unemployment would fall steadily, arriving at about 4.4
percent by 2008. This would be the best of all possible worlds
for present policy. Should productivity growth continue to be
higher than in the past, then unemployment would be corre-
spondingly higher.
Unfortunately, this apparently rosy scenario would not be
stable. Because relative government and foreign deficits would
both be higher than the growth rate of GDP, government and
foreign debt would rise steadily, relative to GDP. By the end of
2008, the former would rise from its 2003 level of 44 percent
to 58 percent, and the latter from 28 percent to 47 percent.
Even with interest rates assumed to be constant, this would
imply a growing interest burden for general government and
for the nation. Were interest rates actually to rise over time, as
the CBO now assumes, then matters would be much worse.
Scenario I: Halving the Deficit by Cutting
Government Spending
The preceding prospects lead us to consider two alternate ways
of reducing the budget deficit. The present administration
clearly favors a reduction in the growth of government spend-
ing as the means of achieving this goal (Andrews 2004).
Accordingly, in Scenario I we examine the potential conse-
quences of a reduction in the growth in government spending
sufficient to halve the deficit in five years, as President Bush
suggested in his 2004 State of the Union address. As of 2003,
the budget deficit stood at 5.2 percent of GDP, which would
make the target level 2.6 percent in 2009. All other assump-
tions, including tax rates and interest rates, are the same as
those in the baseline scenario, and all policy changes are
assumed to come into play in 2005 (i.e.,after the next election).
The chart depicting the main sectoral balances for
Scenario I (Figure 12) shows that when the government deficit
is reduced from its projected level in 2005 toward its target
level of 2.6 percent in 2009 (we display results only until
2008), the foreign deficit also falls, albeit much less, from 5
percent to 4.2 percent.
























































9The trouble with this particular method of deficit reduc-
tion is that our model indicates that this path requires an
actual fall in the level of real government spending, not merely
a reduction in its growth rate. This would lead to significant
negative effects, as indicated in Figure 13. Real GDP growth
would slow to 2.6 percent in 2005, and hover around 2.0 per-
cent thereafter. With this, unemployment would rise from its
6-percent level in 2003 to about 8 percent in 2008. Moreover,
the private sector would fall back into increasing deficits,
which would imply a concomitant rise in private sector debt.
Finally, although the foreign deficit would fall to 4.5 percent
by 2008, that figure is considerably higher than the correspon-
ding GDP growth rate of 2.6 percent, which means that for-
eign debt would continue to rise, relative to GDP. What looks
good in terms of structural balances therefore turns out to be
quite bad for growth and employment.
Scenario II: Halving the Deficit by Rescinding 
Tax Cuts 
We now consider what would happen if we were to achieve the
same target as in the previous scenario—halving government
deficit in five years—by letting the personal tax rate return to
its pre-tax-cut level. Government expenditure is assumed to
grow at the same rate as in our baseline scenario. Our model
then indicates that in order to accomplish the desired budget
reduction, the direct tax rate would have to return to the levels
in effect at the beginning of the Bush administration.As in the
previous scenario, this policy change is assumed to begin in
2005, after the coming election.
The three balances depicted in the first figure of Scenario
II (14) look very similar to their counterparts in Scenario I.
This should come as no surprise, because both scenarios
assume the same deceleration in private sector borrowing, and
both embody the goal of halving the budget deficit by 2009.
Once again the foreign deficit would be modestly reduced,
from 5 percent to 4.2 percent, and once again the private sec-
tor would go back into deficit.
There is a substantial difference between the two scenarios,
however, regarding growth and unemployment. Under the tax
reversion scenario, real GDP growth falls very little, from the
projected high of 4.1 percent in 2004 to 3.8 percent in 2005,
and to 3.2 percent in 2008 (see Figure 15). As a result, the
unemployment rate is actually reduced, albeit only modestly,
10 Strategic Analysis, April 2004























































8from its present level of 5.6 percent in 2004 to a low of 5.1
percent in 2006, before rising back up to about 5.5 percent by
2008. Finally, as before, the foreign deficit falls to 4.1 percent
by 2008, and once again this implies a rising ratio of foreign
debt to GDP. Because the final growth rate is higher than it
was in the previous scenario, however, foreign debt ratios rise
much more slowly.
Summary and Conclusions
Our baseline scenario depicts what is likely to happen if pres-
ent monetary and fiscal policy stances are maintained.We find
that the government deficit would rise to about 5.8 percent, as
would the foreign deficit. The latter would be a new record.
Real GDP growth would rise to about 4.2 percent by 2008, and
on the favorable assumption that productivity growth returns
to its average postwar level, unemployment would fall to
about 4.4 percent.
Unfortunately, this apparently promising scenario is not
stable, because both government and foreign debt would rise
steadily relative to GDP. Even under our neutral assumption of
constant interest rates, this increase would imply steadily ris-
ing interest burdens in both sectors. Were interest rates actu-
ally to rise over time, as the CBO now assumes, then matters
would be much worse.
For this reason, we examined two alternative means of
reducing the government deficit by half over five years, to take
effect in 2005 (i.e., after the coming election). The first of
these, as depicted in the figures representing Scenario I, con-
siders what would happen if this goal were achieved by curtail-
ing government spending. This is the path favored by the
present administration. The second, as depicted in the charts
of Scenario II, examines what would happen if debt reduction
were achieved instead by rolling back recent tax cuts.
Not surprisingly, the two scenarios are quite similar at the
levels of the three main balances. Yet they give quite different
results when we consider the corresponding growth and
unemployment rates. Both begin in 2003 from a growth rate
of 4.1 percent and an unemployment rate of 6 percent. But
halving the budget deficit by cutting government spending
causes the growth rate to fall to 2.6 percent in 2005 and to
about 2.0 percent by 2008, while unemployment rises to about
8 percent over the interval. Conversely, halving the budget
deficit by rescinding recent tax cuts causes GDP growth to fall
only slightly, to 3.8 percent in 2005 and to 3.1 percent by 2008,
while the unemployment rate actually falls to 5.1 percent in
2006 before rising back to 5.5 percent in 2008. The latter sce-
nario also produces less troublesome increases in foreign and
government debt burdens, precisely because it gives rise to
higher growth rates.
Our model therefore indicates that if one wishes to cut
the deficit, it is better to do so by rescinding tax cuts than by
curtailing government expenditures. By the same token, it also
suggests that the sharp rise in actual GDP growth from 2001
through 2003 had more to do with the jump in government
spending than with the reduction in tax rates.
Two further issues should be noted. Our simulations
assume that the devaluation of the U.S. dollar ends in 2004.
Were we to allow for a continued devaluation, our model
shows that it would improve the current account balance and
accelerate growth, provided that interest rates did not rise in
response to the decline in the dollar. On the other hand, if
interest rates were to rise in the future, as projected by the
CBO and others, the prospects of the U.S. economy would
worsen significantly. Interest burdens for the private sector
would rise, which would likely slow down that sector’s
demand for loans and hence its growth in spending. It would
also increase the government’s interest payments, which would
largely benefit foreign holders of government debt, leading to
larger income flows out of the country. These increased inter-
est payments would also tend to worsen the government
deficit, thereby requiring larger cutbacks in government
spending or increases in the tax rates to keep the budget deficit
in line. All of this reminds us that fiscal deficits are inextrica-
bly linked to foreign deficits. As our colleague Wynne Godley
recently noted, “a chronic balance of payments deficit [exter-
nal balance] will make it impossible to balance the budget.
Either the target for the budget must be changed or effective
steps be taken to improve the balance of payments” (Godley
and Izurieta 2004, p. 16).
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1. The figures cited in the text are from the National Income
and Product Accounts, and refer to the general govern-
ment net lending or borrowing, at annualized rates. In
our charts, however, our measure of total public sector
balance, which covers federal, state, and local balances,
differs somewhat from the NIPA figures because we
include government investment in government expendi-
ture, but exclude consumption of government fixed capi-
tal. Our own measure would give a balance of $82 billion
in 2001, -$319 billion in 2002, and -$620 billion in the
third quarter of 2003.
2. The working-age population grew by about 2.4 million
people in 2002, and because the labor-force participation
rate was 67 percent, this implies that about 1.6 million
new job seekers enter the pool every year. This translates
into 134,000 new job seekers every month.
3. The dispute arises from the fact that the BLS produces
two surveys to estimate employment creation: one based
on a random sample of employers that asks for the num-
ber of workers on payroll, and the other based on a ran-
dom sample of households asking for the number of
members employed.
4. Nominal profits deflated by the GDP deflator.
5. Real GDP per employee is the appropriate link between
prospective GDP growth and future employment.
6. Recent average productivity growth is measured over
2001:1–2003:1, in order to encompass a complete set of
peaks and troughs (see Figure 7). This comes to 1.43 per-
cent, which is not very different from the 1960–2003 his-
torical average of 1.56 percent.
7. Not very long ago, both Chairman Greenspan of the
Federal Reserve and (then) Treasury Secretary Robert
Rubin emphasized the importance of budget surpluses in
fending off pressure on the U.S. balance of payments, in
helping keep interest rates low, and in keeping growth
strong (Greenspan 2000, p. 4; Economic Report of the
President 2000, pp. 31–34).
8. The latest CBO report (January 2004) actually assumes
that interest rates will rise over the next few years.
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